Pierre Legrand’s Pink Flamingo Bar

HonestJoe, whatever you do, do not take the words of the cretin that micromanaged the ‘Nam Police Conflict into a total defeat for the US, humiliation for everyone and graveyard for 3 million South Asians, and use them as the standard of truth. That slimy piece of garbage started out the war by making sure that guards at Air Force Bases had the wrong ammunition for their rifles so they wouldn’t shoot any of the enemy because we were trying to be nice to the butchers. He and his boss screwed Vietnam up so bad that Nixon couldn’t salvage it and in fact got painted with the same brush that the troops were painted with. If you’re trying to make a case (and I think that it’s wrong, personally) don’t use one of the most vile politicians that this country has ever had, for proof.

I have read and reread what I posted and I have made sure that it is all based on facts not speculation so I do not understand what is ment by the question “Where is the conclusion of joe’s conspiracy theory?” for I have not said or posted any theory. Yet.

If we look to a book McNamara’s wrote in 1996 “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam:” we find 11 lessons he learned from the Vietnam War.

Lesson 1
“We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.”

Lesson 2
“We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.”

Lesson 3
“We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.”

Lesson 4
“Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.”

Lesson 5
“We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine…”

Lesson 6
“We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture”

Lesson 7
“We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action.”

Lesson 8
“After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.”

Lesson 9
“We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people’s or country’s best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.”

Lesson 10
“We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.”

Lesson 11
“We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.”

Some people belive that we again have made the same mistakes. I feel that we knew better and that we allowed ourselves to be influenced by both foreign interests (we were set up by the Saudi’s) and domestic profit seeking interests that knew this was going to be a long war in Iraq and that we did not have the troops we needed when we went in and that is what they wanted. Some in our government really did belive that we had enough troops and it would be a short war as we would be seen as liberators but they didnt matter then and they dont matter now. Either they were fools or liers. Either go all the way or dont go at all!

The U.S. government conducted a series of secret war games in 1999 that anticipated an invasion of Iraq would require more than 400,000 troops, and even then chaos would ensue.

U.S. Central Command had sponsored the seminar and declassified the secret report in 2004.

70 military, diplomatic and intelligence officials assumed the high troop levels of over 400,000 would be needed to keep order, seal borders and take care of other security needs.

“The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough troops,” said Thomas Blanton, the archive’s director. “But the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground.”

The war games looked at “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios after a war that removed then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power. Some are similar to what actually occurred after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003:

–”A change in regimes does not guarantee stability,” the 1999 seminar briefings said. “A number of factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability.”

–”Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the replacement regime could be problematic – especially if perceived as weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments.”

–”Iran’s anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq,” the briefings read. “The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad.”

–”The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development.”

–”Also, some participants believe that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install and sustain a democratic government.”

–”A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners.”

So where does this leave us going forward? I see two options. One, we find a way to commit 500,000 troops to Iraq. There was a time when we had a multinational force of just that size in the region, but the political capital is long since spent. The only other option I see would be a draft, and even with those troop levels there is no guarantee. Another lesson of Vietnam.

The other option of course is withdrawal. If America withdrew from Iraq and a Sunni-Shi’ite war took off, the narrative of the long war would inevitably change. It would go from Islam versus the West to Islam versus itself and we would reap dividends in the long run.

Redefining the war on terror as essentially the product of ancient feuds within Islam immediately shifts the argument onto terrain favourable to the West. As it stands now our being in Iraq unites the Muslim world against “US”.

Could you imagine these people being paid to lobby for the Soviet Union. Could you imagine people within our government working on behalf of another country that supports communism.

To put it into perspective change the name from Saudi Arabia to the Soviet Union then change terrorism to communism. Now you will understand what I am upset about and why I feel we are not really fighting this war the way we should be. As you say with the gloves off. We are just doing this half a** limited war that wont do anything but cost us the lives of our troops and the money we spend to get them killed.

Pierre Legrand you said:
“So I am just asking myself exactly how successful any campaign is going to be against insurgents that doesn’t target and destroy those who fund, train and equip those insurgents.”

Why in the world would the United States government go so far to protect Saudi Arabia in the face of what itself declares to be the biggest security threat facing our nation and the world today?

The Saudis spend nearly $20 million per year in lobbying activities in the U.S. via their hired agents? What kind of return on investment are they getting out of the United States Congress?

Let’s take Loeffler’s group and examine its value for the Saudi government, since it was paid over $3 million in three years between 2003 and 2005. The firm was founded by former Republican Congressman Tom Loeffler of Texas. Loeffler served in the Republican Leadership as Deputy Whip, and as Chief Deputy Whip during his third and fourth term. He was a member of the powerful Appropriations Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee and Budget Committee. In the two Bush campaigns for governor, Loeffler, who contributed $141,000, was the largest donor. In 1998, he served as national co-chair of the Republican National Committee’s “Team 100″ program for donors of $100,000 or more, and afterwards held the same title during George W. Bush’s presidential campaign. Loeffler’s generosity extends to the members of congress as well. In 6 years, he has given more than $185,000 to members of congress, 97% of it going to only Republican members. During the same six-year period, Loeffler’s firm received more than $18 million in lobbying fees.

The firm’s managing director happens to be William L. Ball. Ball served as Chief of Staff to Senators John Tower (R-TX) and Herman Talmadge (D-GA). In 1985, he joined the Reagan Administration as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. Later he was assigned to the White House to serve President Reagan as his chief liaison to the Congress. Wallace Henderson is also a Partner; he was Chief Counsel and Chief of Staff to Representative W. J. Tauzin (R-LA), Chief of Staff to U.S. Senator John Breaux (D-LA).

By having foreign agents such as the Loeffler Group, in addition to their foreign agents by default, the MIC, the Saudis seem to have all their bases covered. Former secretaries and deputy secretaries with open access to the current ones, former congressmen and senators who used to be positioned on strategically valuable committees and know the rules of the congressional game, and millions of dollars available to be spent and channeled and re-channeled to various PACs go a long way toward ensuring results.

Many of these agents, with their loyalty to the foreign hand that feeds them, end up being appointed to various positions, commissions and special envoys by our government. Recall Kissinger and his appointment to head the 9/11 Commission, and of course the recent revelation by Woodward on his advisory position to the current White House. Take a look at Jimmy Baker’s current appointment on the Iraq commission. Same goes for the father of all the “dime a dozen generals”, Brent Scowcroft, and one of his new prot’s, General Joseph Ralston.

With “dime a dozen” generals on their boards of directors, numerous high-powered ex congressmen and senators at their disposal in the “K Street Lobby Quarter,” tens of millions of dollars in campaign donations, and billions of dollars at stake, the Military Industrial Complex surely had all the incentives to act just as foreign agents would, and fight for their highly valued client; the Saudi Government.

I agree with the need for human intelligence but you have to admitt that there was plenty of warnigs before 9/11.

Pierre Legrand you said:
“Human Intelligence is perhaps the most crucial aspect of intelligence gathering and his decision to eliminate 800 highly trained Operators led directly, some say, to 9/11.”

Administration officials were made aware of the vast array of Al Qaeda threats and warnings that existed in years prior, and more importantly, in the weeks leading up to September 11, 2001.

Richard Ben-Veniste said the following to Condoleezza Rice the following question during her appearance before the 9/11 Commission:

“The extraordinary high terrorist attack threat level in the summer of 2001 is well documented, and Richard Clarke’s testimony about the possibility of an attack against the United States homeland was repeatedly discussed from May to August within the intelligence community, and that is well documented. You acknowledged that Richard Clarke told you that Al-Qaeda cells were in the United States.”

The August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief was entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”.

The CIA Director had warned congress shortly before 9/11 “that there could be an attack, an imminent attack, on the United States of this nature. So this is not entirely unexpected” according to a broadcast on National Public Radio.

Newsweek stated “On Sept. 10, NEWSWEEK has learned, a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns”.

It was widely known within the FBI shortly before 9/11 that an imminent attack was planned on lower Manhattan.

An employee who worked in the south tower stated “How could they let this happen? They knew this building was a target. Over the past few weeks we’d been evacuated a number of times, which is unusual. I think they had an inkling something was going on”.

And a guard who worked in the world trade center stated that “officials had recently taken steps to secure the towers against aerial attacks”.

According to MSNBC, “There have been a slew of reports over the past decade of plots to use planes to strike American targets”.

For example, a 1998 report forwarded from the FBI to the Federal Aviation Administration concluded that “a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane . . . into the World Trade Center”.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the military air defense agency responsible for protecting the U.S. mainland, had run drills for several years of planes being used as weapons against the World Trade Center and other U.S. high-profile buildings, and “numerous types of civilian and military aircraft were used as mock hijacked aircraft”. In other words, drills using REAL AIRCRAFT simulating terrorist attacks crashing jets into buildings, including the twin towers, were run.

And a pre-9/11 National Intelligence Estimate was entitled “Islamic Extremists Learn to Fly”, and was apparently about Islamic people taking classes at U.S. flight schools.

When we add the July 10, 2001 meeting to the plethora of other clear warnings that our government had, a very concise view of the al Qaeda threat emerges. Those other warnings include, but are not limited to:

29 Warnings from leaders of other nations and foreign intelligence apparatus’ of terrorist threats

June 30, 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Briefing (SEIB) entitled “bin Laden Threats Are Real”

The threat of President Bush’s assassination at the G-8 Summit by al Qaeda in July of 2001 – using aircraft to dive bomb the summit building

July 2001 Phoenix memo, which told of potential terrorists taking flight lessons

52 FAA warnings – five of which mentioned al Qaeda’s training for hijacking

August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief entitled “bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)entitled “Islamist Extremists Learn to Fly”

Intelligence agency heads describing themselves with their “hair on fire” to characterize the imminent nature of the threats they were intercepting from Al Qaeda and their sense of urgency in relating them to the Bush Administration

The arrest of Zacharias Moussaoui in August of 2001

FBI Agent Harry Samit’s 70 unsuccessful attempts to get a FISA Warrant to examine Moussaoui’s belongings